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Abstract
We describe here a structured system for distributed mechanism
design appropriate for the Internet applications. In our approach the
players dynamically form a network in which they know neither their
neighbours nor the size of the network and interact to jointly take deci-
sions. The only assumption concerning the underlying communication
layer is that for each pair of processes there is a path of neighbours
connecting them. This allows us to deal with arbitrary network topolo-
gies.
We also discuss the implementation of this system which consists of
a sequence of layers. The lower layers deal with the operations relevant
for distributed computing only, while the upper layers are concerned
only with communication among players, including broadcasting and
multicasting, and distributed decision making. This yields a highly
flexible distributed system whose specific applications are realized as
instances of its top layer. This design is implemented in Java.
The system supports fault-tolerance and can be augmented by a
provision for distributed policing the purpose of which is to exclude
‘dishonest’ players. Also, it can be used for repeated creation of dy-
namically formed networks of players interested in a joint decision mak-
ing implemented by means of a tax-based mechanism. We illustrate
its flexibility by discussing a number of implemented examples.
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†University of Amsterdam
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background and motivation
Mechanism design is one of the important areas of economics. To quote from
[7], it deals with the problem of ‘how to arrange our economic interactions
so that, when everyone behaves in a self-interested manner, the result is
something we all like.’ So these interactions are supposed to yield desired
social decisions when each agent is interested in maximizing only his own
utility.
The traditional approaches rely on the existence of a central authority
who collects the information from the players, computes the decision and in-
forms the players about the outcome and their taxes. The increasing reliance
on decision making carried out through Internet leads to a natural need for
distributed solutions that do not rely on any central authority. But how
to translate such real-world considerations into design and implementation
that can be used in practice?
This question was recently addressed in a series of papers distributed
mechanism design. In this setting no central authority exists and the deci-
sions are taken by the players themselves. The challenge here is to appro-
priately combine the techniques of distributed computing with those that
deal with the matters specific to mechanism design, notably rationality (i.e.,
appropriately defined self-interest) and truth-telling (i.e., incentive compat-
ibility).
However, to properly implement decision making in the context of the
Internet one needs to address other issues, as well. First of all, one should
provide an open system that can deal with the initially unknown number
of interested users. Second, one should support connectivity between the
users who can dynamically join the system. Further, one should be able
to cope with unreliable (hacked or faulty software or hardware in) user
devices that can lead to system failures. Also, it is desirable to provide
ways of dealing with the dishonest users, such as their identification and
possible exclusion. These additional issues have been hardly considered in
the papers of distributed mechanism design. In this paper we discuss a
system for distributed mechanism design that addresses all these issues and
that can be readily used in the Internet setting.
1.2 Related work
A number of recent papers deal with different aspects of distributed com-
puting in connection with game theory and mechanism design.
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Among them, some focus on complexity such as communication complex-
ity. Some target computation/communication/incentive compatibility and
eventually faithful implementation. Others try to build a secure computa-
tion in a distributed system. More recently, there has been a series of work
on distributed constraint optimization and partial centralized techniques.
The authors of [12] focused on message communication by players in a
distributed game. However, they assume that there is a center to which every
player is directly connected. An influential paper [6] introduced the notion
of distributed algorithmic mechanism design emphasizing the issues of com-
putational complexity and incentive compatibility in distributed computing.
Next, [13] studied the distributed implementations of the VCG mechanism.
However, in their approach there is still a center that is ultimately respon-
sible for selecting and enforcing the outcome.
The authors of [18] considered the problem of creating distributed system
specifications that will be faithfully implemented in networks with rational
(i.e., self-interested) nodes so that no node will choose to deviate from the
specification. They used interdomain routing as an example and suggested
ways to detect when nodes deviate from their specified communication. In
turn, [8] proposed in the context of secure computation a stronger form of
computation in that it solely depends on players’ rationality instead of their
honesty.
Researchers of [16] introduced the first distributed implementation of the
VCG mechanism. The only central authority required was a bank that is in
charge of the computation of taxes. The authors also discussed a method
to redistribute some of the VCG payments back to players. Finally, [15]
proposed a new partial centralization technique, PC-DPOP, based on the
DPOP algorithm of [14]. PC-DPOP provides a better control over what
parts of the problem are centralized and allows this centralization to be
optimal with respect to the chosen communication structure.
1.3 Contributions
In this paper we propose a platform for distributed mechanism design that
can be readily used in the context of the Internet and customized to specific
purposes. Also it can be used for a repeated distributed decision making
process, each round involving a different group of interested players.
Our platform supports the distributed implementation of the large class
of tax-based mechanisms that implement the decisions either in dominant
strategies or in a Nash equilibrium (see, e.g., [10]). This aspect of our
work is closest to [16] whose approach is based on distributed constraint
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programming. In contrast, our approach builds upon a very general view
of distributed programming, an area that developed a variety of techniques
appropriate for the problem at hand and that is more appropriate for the
Internet applications.
To support the Internet-based applications we ensure connectivity be-
tween the players by means of a backbone of interconnected local reg-
istries. The dynamic network creation is realized by means of players’
registration in their local registries. This allows us to support the open
system aspect of the platform by allowing the presence of initially unknown
number of interested players.
To realize concrete applications we only need to provide a backbone of
local registries and select specific registration schemes for participating in
the mechanism. The former can be taken care of by stipulating that each
geographic or logical region, such as a country, city, or Internet domain
has its own local registry. Interested players can find the addresses of their
respective local registries in public fora, e.g., local government web sites.
To take care of the latter we can for example stipulate that the registration
is successful only if it took place before a certain deadline that refers to a
global clock, or if some quorum (minimum number) of registered players is
reached at each local registry, and/or if a global quorum of registered players
is reached.
Our platform is built out of a number of layers. This leads to a flexi-
ble, hierarchical design in which the lower layers are concerned only with
the matters relevant for distributed computing, such as communication and
synchronization issues, and are clearly separated from the upper layers that
deal with the relevant aspects of the mechanism design, such as computation
of the desired decision.
More specifically, the lowest communication layer allows us to detect pro-
cess failure and provides an asynchronous, non-order-preserving send oper-
ation. The next layer provides a message efficient, fault-tolerant distributed
termination detection (see, e.g., [11]) algorithm. In turn, the high-level com-
munication layer supports a generic broadcast command that supports
communication among players and ensures that each broadcast message is
eventually delivered to each registered player. Its implementation relies only
on the assumption that for each pair of registered players there is a path of
neighbouring processes connecting them. Any specific application, such as
an appropriate instance of the Groves mechanism (see, e.g., [10]), is realized
simply as an instantiation of a top layer. Finally, the deliberately limited
GUI prevents players from tampering with the system.
This layered architecture, in conjunction with the use of local registries
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and registration requirement, offers a number of novel features and improve-
ments to the approach of [16], to wit
• we deal with a larger class of mechanisms, notably Groves mechanisms.
They include the VCG mechanism and various forms of redistributions
of VCG payments recently studied in the literature (and considered in
[16]). Additionally, we can easily tailor our platform to other tax-based
mechanisms, such as Walker mechanism (see [19]),
• we support open systems in which the number of players can be un-
known,
• the bank process of [16] is replaced by a weaker tax collector process.
It is needed only for the mechanisms that are not balanced, wherein
it is a passive process used only to receive messages to collect the
resulting deficit,
• fault-tolerance is supported, both on the message transmission level
and on the player processes level (with an option for a restart in the
case of the detection of a failed player process),
• a multi-level protection against manipulations is provided,
• our platform makes it possible to implement distributed policing
that provides an alternative to a ‘central enforcer’ whose responsibility
is to implement the outcome decided by the agents and collect the
taxes (see, e.g., [5, page 366]).
Fault-tolerance at the mechanism design level means that the final de-
cision and taxes can be computed even after some of the processes that
broadcast the players’ types crash: the other processes then still can pro-
ceed. This is achieved by the duplication of the computation by all players.
Such a redundancy is common in all approaches to fault-tolerance (and also
used to prevent manipulations, see [5, page 366]). In [17] it is used to realize
two natural requirements for a distributed mechanism implementation: com-
putation compatibility and communication compatibility. Redundancy was
intentionally avoided in [16] which aimed at minimizing the overall com-
munication and computation costs. In our approach it allows the fastest
process to ‘dominate’ the computation and move it forward more quickly.
This design is implemented in Java and was tested on a number of exam-
ples including Vickrey auction with redistribution, two types of auctions and
a sequential mechanism design, described in the second part of the paper.
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1.4 Paper organization
In the next section we review the basic facts about the tax-based mech-
anisms, notably the Groves family of mechanisms. Then in Section 3 we
discuss the issues that need to be taken care of when moving from the cen-
tralized tax-based mechanisms to distributed ones and what approach we
took to tackle these issues. The details of our design and implementation
are provided in Section 4.
Next, in Section 5, we discuss three important advantages of our design:
security, distributed policing and fault-tolerance. The aim of Section 6 is
to present a number of examples of mechanisms that we implemented using
our system. Then, in Section 7 we provide conclusions and discuss future
work. Finally, in two appendices we discuss the details of our algorithm that
computes the tax scheme and present a sample interaction with our system.
2 Mechanism design: the classical view
We recall here briefly tax-based mechanisms, notably the family of Groves
mechanisms, see, e.g., [10, Chapter 23]. Assume a set of decisions D,
a set {1, . . . , n} of players, for each player a set of types Θi and a utility
function vi : D×Θi →R. In this context a type is some private information
known only to the player, for example a vector of player’s valuations of the
items for sale in a multi-unit auction.
A decision rule is a function f : Θ → D, where Θ := Θ1 × · · · × Θn.
We call the tuple
(D,Θ1, . . . ,Θn, v1, . . . , vn, f)
a decision problem .
A decision rule f is called efficient if for all θ ∈ Θ and d′ ∈ D
n∑
i=1
vi(f(θ), θi) ≥
n∑
i=1
vi(d
′, θi),
and strategy-proof (or incentive compatible) if for all θ ∈ Θ, i ∈
{1, . . . , n} and θ′i ∈ Θi
vi(f(θi, θ−i), θi) ≥ vi(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi),
where θ−i := (θ1, . . . , θi−1, θi+1, . . . , θn) and (θ
′
i, θ−i) := (θ1, . . . , θi−1, θ
′
i, θi+1,
. . . , θn).
In mechanism design one is interested in the ways of inducing the players
to announce their true types, i.e., in transforming the decision rules to the
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ones that are strategy-proof. In tax-based mechanisms this is achieved by
extending the original decision rule by means of taxes that are computed
by the central authority from the vector of the received types, using players’
utility functions.
Given a decision problem, in the classical setting, one considers then the
following sequence of events, where f is a given, publicly known, decision
rule:
(i) each player i receives a type θi,
(ii) each player i announces to the central authority a type θ′i; this yields
a joint type θ′ := (θ′1, . . . , θ
′
n),
(iii) the central authority then makes the decision d := f(θ′), computes the
sequence of taxes t := g(θ′), where g : Θ → Rn is a given function,
and communicates to each player i the decision d and the tax |ti| he
needs to pay to (if ti ≤ 0) or to receive from (if ti > 0) the central
authority.
(iv) the resulting utility for player i is then ui(d, t) := vi(d, θi) + ti.
Each Groves mechanism is obtained using g(θ′) := (t1(θ
′), . . . , tn(θ
′)),
where for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
• hi : Θ−i → R is an arbitrary function,
• ti : Θ→ R is defined by
ti(θ
′) := hi(θ
′
−i) +
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
vj(f(θ
′), θ′j).
Intuitively, the sum
∑
j 6=i vj(f(θ
′), θ′j) represents the society benefit from
the decision f(θ′), with player i excluded.
The importance of the Groves mechanisms is revealed by the following
crucial result, in which we refer to the expanded decision rule (f, g) : Θ →
D ×Rn.
Groves Theorem Suppose the decision rule f is efficient. Then in each
Groves mechanism the decision rule (f, g) is strategy-proof w.r.t. the utility
functions u1, . . . , un.
The proof is remarkably straightforward so we reproduce it for the con-
venience of the reader.
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Proof. Since f is efficient, for all θ ∈ Θ, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and θ′i ∈ Θi we have
ui((f, t)(θi, θ−i), θi) =
n∑
j=1
vi(f(θi, θ−i), θi) + hi(θ−i)
≥
n∑
j=1
vi(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi) + hi(θ−i)
= ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi).
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When for a given tax-based mechanism for all θ′ we have
∑n
i=1 ti(θ
′) ≤
0, the mechanism is called feasible (which means that it can be realized
without external financing) and when for all θ′ we have
∑n
i=1 ti(θ
′) = 0, the
mechanism is called balanced (which means that it can be realized without
a deficit).
Each Groves mechanism depends on the functions h1, . . ., hn. A special
case, called Clarke mechanism , or Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mecha-
nism (in short VCG) is obtained by using
hi(θ
′
−i) := −max
d∈D
∑
j 6=i
vj(d, θ
′
j).
So then
ti(θ
′) :=
∑
j 6=i
vj(f(θ
′), θ′j)−max
d∈D
∑
j 6=i
vj(d, θ
′
j).
Hence for all θ′ and i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we have ti(θ
′) ≤ 0, which means
that the VCG mechanism is feasible and that each player needs to make the
payment |ti(θ
′)| to the central authority. Other feasible Groves mechanisms
exist in which some players receive the payments and others have to make
the payments, for example the one proposed in [4], which we discuss in
Subsection 6.1.
3 Our approach
In our approach we relax a number of the assumptions made when intro-
ducing mechanism design. More specifically we assume that
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• there is no central authority,
• players interested in participating in a specific mechanism register to
join an open system wherein that mechanism runs. A tax collector
process is part of this system,
• the players whose registration is accepted inform other registered play-
ers about their types,
• once a registered player learns that he has received the types from all
registered players, he computes the decision and the taxes, sends this
information to other registered players, and possibly the tax collector
process, and terminates his computation.
We also assume that there is no collusion among the players. This leads
to an implementation of the mechanism design by means of anonymous
(i.e., name independent) distributed processes, in absence of any central
authority. Because of the distributed nature of this approach no global
state, in particular no global clock, exists. The computation of the decision
and of the taxes is carried out by the players themselves.
As it stands, this revised setting is not clear on a number of counts. First,
we need to clarify the registration process, in particular what it implies and
when it ends. In our approach each player is represented by a process, in
short a player process. A player who wishes to join a specific mechanism
(e.g., an auction) must register with a local registry . Local registries are
linked together in a network that satisfies the full reachability condition
described in Subsection 4.2 (and we assume one of them is designated as the
initiator mentioned in that subsection). Receiving his registration request, a
local registry verifies the eligibility of a player (e.g., whether his IP address
puts him under the jurisdiction of this registry) and accepts his request if
the registration conditions for the specific mechanism (e.g., a deadline) are
met.
Second, once the registration process ends, in the resulting network a
player process may not know the identities of other player processes, so the
announcement of one’s type to all other players needs to be explained. In
our approach we assume that once a player process is registered, it joins
the network of (registry and player) processes wherein a generic broadcast
command is available. The implementation of this command relies only on
the assumption that for each pair of players there is a path of neighbouring
processes connecting them. This allows us to deal with arbitrary network
topologies in a simple way.
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The topology of this network is irrelevant both from the point of view of
the individual processes, as well as the semantics of the broadcast command.
The full reachability of the backbone network of local registries is enough to
ensure that as long as each player process knows and is known by its local
registry, full reachability also holds for the whole network. The broadcast
command uses the connectivity of this network to ensure that a copy of a
broadcast message is eventually delivered to every registered player in finite
time. These messages are transmitted through paths managed in a lower
layer which the player processes cannot access.
This automatically prevents manipulation by player processes of mes-
sages originating from or destined for other players. Such manipulations are
possible in other schemes, such as in [5, page 366], where the player pro-
cesses connected in a ring are computing a Vickrey (second-price) auction of
a single good. The processes are expected to pass around a message contain-
ing the top two bids for that good. This opens the possibility of cheating by
a process by simply manipulating the messages that it is expected to pass
through. Indeed, by putting a high bid and by substantially lowering the
second lowest bid a player process can get the good more cheaply (at least
when it is the last player process to bid). In our set up a player process
cannot access the bids of other player processes before broadcasting its own
bid (unless one explicitly considers a sequential set up, see Subsection 6.4).
Moreover, no messages destined for a player process pass through another
player process.
Third, we need to clarify how each player process will know that he in-
deed received the types announced by all other registered players. We solve
this problem by assuming that each player process after broadcasting the
player’s type participates in a distributed termination detection algo-
rithm the aim of which is to learn whether all players have indeed broadcast
their types. This algorithm is tailored to deal with the communication by
means of multicasting (which subsumes broadcasting).
If this algorithm detects termination, the player process knows that he
indeed received all types, and in particular can determine at this stage the
number of players and their names. From that moment on each player pro-
cess uses the same naming scheme when referring to other player processes.
The uniqueness is ensured by a local scheme for generating globally unique
player identifiers. More generally, we use the distributed termination detec-
tion algorithm to delineate the end of each phase of the distributed compu-
tation: registration, type broadcast, etc., i.e., for barrier synchronization
(see, e.g., [1]).
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Fourth, to ensure the correctness of the above approach, it is crucial that
each player process computes the same decision and the same information
concerning taxes. The former is taken care of by the fact that each player
process uses the same, publicly known, decision rule f that each player
learns, for example from a public bulletin board, and that is used by the
player process after its registration is accepted.
Further, each player process applies f to the same input θ′ and computes
the same tax scheme by which we mean a specific vector of payments
tax(t1), . . . tax(tn) computed from the tax vector (t1, . . . , tn), where tax(tj)
specifies the amounts that player j has to pay to other players and possibly
the tax collector from his tax tj. All tax schemes tax(t1), . . . tax(tn) then
determine ‘who pays how much to whom’. In general most taxes equal 0,
so we optimize the computation by generating reduced tax schemes in
which only non-zero entries are listed and by multicasting them instead of
broadcasting. Note also that to compute the taxes each player process needs
to know the utility functions of other player processes. The tax collector
process is only needed for the mechanisms that are not balanced.
Finally, it is important to note that our approach allows for a repeated
mechanism , that is several rounds of decision making can take place, by
means of the same given mechanism, each time involving a possibly different
group of players. To this end we need to logically separate each round of
the mechanism. This is handled, again, using our distributed termination
detection algorithm for barrier synchronization.
4 Implementation
Our distributed mechanism design system is implemented in Java. The im-
plementation follows the guidelines explained in the previous section. Fig-
ure 1 shows the overall architecture of our system and the different layers
of software used in its implementation. The implementation of the first two
layers is about 9K lines of Java code. It was developed by Kees Blom and
took about 2 man years. The remainder of the system is about 3.5K lines
of Java code and was developed by Huiye Ma during the last 9 months. We
also relied on software for message passing between internet-based parallel
processes developed by Han Noot. Each entity in this architecture com-
municates, either through function calls or method invocations, only with
its adjacent entities. Specific applications are realized by instantiating the
crucial player process layer.
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BTTF 
Low Level Communication
RegistryHigh Level Communication
Player GUI
Player Process
Tax Collector Process
Tax Collector S.I.
Figure 1: Implementation architecture
4.1 Low Level Communication
The Low Level Communication (LLC) layer supports (1) locally generated,
globally unique process identifiers, and (2) reliable non-order-preserving,
asynchronous, targeted communication, exclusively through the exchange
of passive messages between processes. The only means of communication
between processes in LLC is through message passing, where no transfer of
control takes place when messages are exchanged.
Targeted means that the sender of a message explicitly specifies the re-
cipient of the message. Asynchronous means that the receiver of a message is
not guaranteed to have received the message upon the completion of the send
operation. Non-order-preserving means that the temporal order of messages
sent from the same sender to the same receiver is not necessarily preserved.
Reliable means that every message sent by a sender will be received by its
target receiver in finite but indeterminate time, without alteration and in its
entirety (unless the receiver process fails or terminates). A message sent to
a non-existent (terminated or failed) process will be returned to its sender
intact, in finite but indeterminate time (a time-out).
The interface provided by the LLC layer contains the two operations
llsend(m, r) and llreceive(m, t). The llsend(m, r) operation sends
the message m to its target process r and returns a Boolean value that
indicates the success or failure of the operation. A send operation may fail,
for instance, if the size of the message is above the capacity threshold of the
transport mechanism, or due to other possible internal errors. Successful
send simply means that the message has been dispatched on its way to its
specified target.
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The llreceive(m, t) operation blocks its calling process, p, until either
(a) a message sent to p has arrived, or (b) the specified time-out t has
expired. In the first case, llreceive() returns true and passes the received
message in m. In the second case, this function returns false to indicate
that the time-out t has expired.
4.2 BTTF
The Back To The Future (BTTF) layer implements a message efficient, fault-
tolerant distributed termination detection (DTD) algorithm, on top of the
LLC layer. The details of the BTTF DTD algorithm are described in [3]
and lie beyond the scope of this paper. We describe here only those salient
features of this algorithm and its implementation that are pertinent for our
application.
Specifically, the BTTF layer contains the implementation of the BTTF
Wave algorithm, which is a wave DTD algorithm. All wave DTD algorithms
determine termination using a cascading wave of special control messages,
called tokens. They also require the designation of a single process as the
initiator , which is responsible for initiating the token waves, and typically,
several rounds of token waves are necessary for the initiator to detect global
termination. In each round, a cascading wave of tokens travels through every
process in the system and collects its status information for the initiator.
In the BTTF algorithm, the initiator is anonymous, i.e., no process
(other than the initiator) knows who the initiator is. All aspects of token
handling and termination detection are transparently handled internally by
the BTTF algorithm. The BTTFWave algorithm is message efficient: in the
absence of process failures, to detect termination in a system of m processes
that exchange a total of n normal messages, it requires only O(n) control
messages plus 2 rounds of token waves, where each round contains between
O(m) to O(m2) token messages. The BTTF algorithm transparently detects
and tolerates persistent process failures through an optional probing mech-
anism. Probing adds an extra cost of O(n) control messages. Termination
detection is costlier when process failures actually occur, because they may
increase the number of required rounds of token waves: the BTTF Wave
algorithm requires 2 successive failure-free rounds to detect termination.
Every process in the BTTF Wave algorithm must maintain a set of iden-
tifiers of k ≥ 0 other processes in the system, called its buddies. The buddies
sets of processes are transparently used by the BTTFWave algorithm to cas-
cade its token waves. The processes in the buddies set of a process p may
or may not be the same as (some of) the processes that communicate with
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(i.e., send messages to, or receive messages from) p. The only requirement
on the buddies sets of processes is that they must collectively provide the
initiator with full reachability.
More precisely, let P be the finite set of processes in a system, and let
b1(p) designate the buddies set of a process p ∈ P . For integers i > 0, define
bi+1(p) =
⋃
x∈bi(p)
bi(x) ∪ bi(p).
Since P is finite, there exists an i > 0 for which the above definition reaches
a fixed point b∗(p), where b∗(p) = bi+1(p) = bi(p). The full reachability
requirement of the BTTF algorithm holds if for the initiator process a ∈ P ,
b∗(a) ∪ {a} = P . Even when the failure of a process x ∈ P partitions the
remaining processes P \{x} into two or more mutually unreachable subsets,
the BTTF algorithm continues undeterred in the partition b∗(a) ∪ {a} \
{x} ⊂ P \ {x} that includes the initiator process a. (In the calculation of
b∗(a), the b1(x) of a failed process x is ∅.)
In practice, there are many simple, local schemes that guarantee the
full reachability requirement of the BTTF algorithm. For instance, in the
common case where a system starts from a single process which transitively
creates all other processes in the system, it is sufficient that each process
keeps only its immediate parent and its immediate children in its buddies
set. In this case, any process can be designated as the initiator, and each
round of token waves involves O(m) token messages.
Aside from its responsibility to maintain its buddies list (e.g., adding
its newly created children processes), a process using the BTTF algorithm
is oblivious to the details of termination detection and failure recovery. A
process starts by calling the initialization function provided by the BTTF
layer. At this point the process is active. While active, a process can use
the send and receive functions of the BTTF to send and receive messages
to and from other processes. A process becomes passive when it is prepared
to terminate. Termination is detected when all processes in the system are
passive. It is possible for a process that is (still) active to send a message to
a passive process, which when received, will automatically change the status
of the receiver back to active, allowing it to send and receive more messages.
The BTTF layer provides two receive functions in its interface: receive()
and passiveReceive(). A process uses receive() when it expects to re-
ceive a message from another process, while it is not prepared to termi-
nate. A call to receive() blocks until it returns either with a received
message, or when its optionally specified time-out parameter expires. Call-
ing passiveReceive() indicates that the process is prepared to terminate,
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unless it receives a message. A call to passiveReceive() blocks until it
returns either with a received message, or with an indication that global
termination has been detected.
The DTD functionality provided by the BTTF layer can be used for bar-
rier synchronization as well as for termination detection. Once passiveReceive()
indicates termination has been detected, the calling process knows that all
processes in the system have reached the same ‘termination barrier’. This
termination barrier is either the actual termination of the processes, or the
virtual termination of only the current phase of the activity in the system.
In the first case, the calling process must perform its local clean-up and
terminate. In the second case, the process must start a new phase of its
computation by calling the initialization function of the BTTF layer once
more.
The implementation of the BTTF layer requires only the llsend(m, r)
and llreceive(m, t) operations provided by the LLC layer. It provides
an interface consisting of the following functions:
• initializeBTTFWave(. . .) This function (re)initializes the calling pro-
cess, enabling it to participate in the (next phase of) global compu-
tation. The details of the parameters of this function are beyond the
scope of this paper.
• insertBuddy(p) This function call inserts the specified process p in
the buddies set of the calling process.
• removeBuddy(p) This function call removes the specified process p
from the buddies set of the calling process.
• send(m, T) This function implements a delayed multicast operation.
It schedules a copy of the message m to be sent to every process in the
target set of processes T. The actual dispatch of the messages to their
specified targets will take place upon a subsequent call to one of the
functions prioritySend(), receive(), or passiveReceive().
• prioritySend(m, T) This function implements a multicast operation.
It first sends all messages scheduled by earlier calls to send(), if any,
and then sends a copy of the message m to every process in the target
set of processes T.
• receive(m, t) The parameter t is an integer value. Negative t values
indicate indefinite wait, and non-negative values specify a time-out
value in milliseconds. A call to this function blocks until either the
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specified time-out expires, or a message sent to the calling process
is available. If the specified time-out expires, the return result of this
function is false and the value of m is undefined. If a received message
is available, this function returns the message in m and returns true.
• passiveReceive(m) A call to this function blocks until either global
termination (of the current phase of the computation) is detected, or
a message sent to the calling process is available. If termination is
detected, the return result of this function is false and the value of m
is undefined. If a received message is available, this function returns
the message in m and returns true.
4.3 High Level Communication and Registry
The High Level Communication (HLC) layer provides indirect, anonymous
communication among the players in a distributed system. It includes a
number of local registries whose mutual connectivity supports the full con-
nectivity of the players necessary for broadcast. A player must sign-in at
a local registry, after which it can use the other operations provided by
the HLC layer to take part in the mechanism. It provides the following
functions:
• signin(r, mech) This function allows the calling player process to
sign at the local registry r so that it can take part in the mechanism
mech. The player can start the first phase of the mechanism mech right
after a successful return of a call to this function.
• signout(mech) This function terminates the participation of the call-
ing player process in the mechanism mech.
• bsend(m) This function broadcasts the message m to all registered
players in the game.
• msend(m, T) This function multicasts the message m to every player
in the target set T.
• receive(m, t) This function is the same as its homonym in the BTTF
layer.
• passiveReceive(m) This function is the same as its homonym in the
BTTF layer.
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Each local registry is responsible for processing the registrations of the
player processes according to the assumed registration criteria. Also, it
maintains for each implemented mechanism the corresponding locking pol-
icy . Each such policy regulates the conditions under which the player pro-
cesses can receive messages sent to them or can broadcast or multicast mes-
sages. It is loaded each time a player process successfully registers. We shall
return to this matter in the next subsection and in Subsection 6.4.
4.4 Player Process
Specific applications are implemented using this top layer. It is built on top
of the HLC layer and is used to implement specific actions of the players, in
particular the computation of the decisions and taxes. In our implementa-
tion of the distributed mechanism design the following sequence of actions
takes place for each player i, where flag is a local Boolean variable. By
termination loop we mean here the statement
while (passiveReceive(m)) {
process message m;
}
and by inspect loop we mean the statement
flag = false;
while (receive(m, 100)) {
if (m is the pair (decision, tax scheme)) {
flag = true;
process message m;
}
}
where 100 is some arbitrary time-out in miliseconds.
The details of the processing of each received message m depend on the
context.
(i) process pi representing player i is created and assigned a globally
unique name,
(ii) pi obtains player i’s type,
(iii) pi signs in at the local registry r in its region using the signin(r,
mech) call,
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(iv) if pi receives the confirmation of the registration (the call of signin(r,
mech) is successful), it broadcasts player i’s type using the bsend()
function (and otherwise it terminates),
(v) pi performs the termination loop. The corresponding process m
statement in this loop consists of storing the type received from an-
other registered player process. When this loops ends (that is, when
pi has received the types from all registered player processes and the
global termination is detected) pi has a globally unique naming scheme
at its disposal to refer to the registered player processes, and the num-
ber of registered players n that equals the number of types it has
received,
(vi) pi performs the inspect loop to determine whether another process
has already computed the decision and the tax scheme. If this is the
case, flag will be set true,
(vii) if flag is not true, pi computes the decision and the tax scheme of
the players and multicasts using the msend() function the decision and
the tax scheme to the processes representing players who need to pay
or receive taxes and the decision to the other processes. If pi needs to
pay some tax t′ > 0 to the tax collector, it sends this information to
the tax collector process using the msend() function,
(viii) pi performs the termination loop,
(ix) when it ends and after pi receives from the tax collector process the
total amount of taxes the tax collector received, pi performs the
termination loop again and terminates.
The details of the tax scheme algorithm can be found in Appendix I.
The above description of the player process assumes that the underlying
mechanism is simultaneous. The corresponding locking policy, loaded by the
local registry, blocks the receive(m, t) and passiveReceive(m) functions
of the pi process until it has broadcast its type.
4.5 Tax Collector Software Interface
This layer is built on top of the HLC layer. It provides two functions also
available in the HLC layer, passiveReceive(m) and bsend(m), and two new
functions, tsignin(r, mech) and tsignout(mech), which are the counter-
parts of the signin(r, mech) and signout(mech) functions of the HLC
layer and which are used to deal with the tax collector process registration.
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4.6 Tax Collector Process
This layer is built on top of the Tax Collector Software Interface layer and
is used to implement the actions of the tax collector which is in charge of
collecting players’ taxes. The following sequence of actions takes place for
it:
(i) The tax collector process ta representing the tax collector is created
and assigned a globally unique name known to every player. It signs
in at the local registry in his region using the tsignin(r, mech) call
(which always succeeds),
(ii) ta performs the termination loop (to synchronize the computation
phases with the player processes),
(iii) ta performs the termination loop again. When it ends, the tax
collector process has received all the taxes from the players. They are
kept on a single account,
(iv) ta broadcasts the total amount on its single account to all players,
(v) ta performs the termination loop and terminates.
4.7 Player GUI
The interaction between the player (user) and the system is realized in this
interface. The interaction is limited to the registration, type submission and
tax reception.
5 Security, Distributed Policing and Fault-tolerance
Let us discuss now some consequences of this design.
5.1 Security
The architecture presented in the previous section allows multiple alternative
implementations, in each of which the constituents that comprise each layer
get allocated to run on a different set of hosts. Figure 2 shows an example
mapping of constituents to ‘logical hosts’. In any concrete implementation
one or more such logical hosts can represent the same actual physical host.
At the core of Figure 2 lies a communications network , represented
by the cloud shape, that interconnects a number of hosts to provide the
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Figure 2: Possible realization of the platform
functionality described in the LLC layer in Subsection 4.1. The specific
hosts connected to this network that concern us are a set of gateway hosts
that run the BTTF and the HLC layers.
The ring of hosts around the core in Figure 2 contains the set of hosts
that run the local registries. Every local registry has a primary connec-
tion to a gateway host in the core. Thus, the full reachability of the gateway
hosts in the core ensures full reachability among local registries.
The next ring of hosts in Figure 2 contains hosts that run player
processes. Each player process establishes an initial link (dotted lines) with
a local registry (whose address it obtains from a local forum) to register. As
part of this registration process, its local registry provides the address of
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a gateway host with which the player process then establishes its primary
communication link (solid lines) for the rest of the game.
Finally, the outermost ring in Figure 2 consists merely of computers
that run GUI programs that link to their respective player processes.
This ‘ring structure’ provides a multiple protection scheme against ma-
nipulations by the players. First, the assignment of a gateway host to the
player process, provided by the local registries, is done dynamically. So
there is no way for a player process to know before-hand which host its local
registry will propose as its gateway.
Next, the only messages that pass through a local registry are the ones
involving its locally registered players. Likewise, the only messages that
pass through a player process are the ones originating from or destined for
that specific player. This, as already mentioned in Section 3, automatically
prevents manipulation by player processes of messages originating from or
destined for other players.
Further, the end users have physical access only to the outermost hosts
that run the GUI programs, which severely restricts the range of their po-
tentially dangerous actions. Finally, the separation of the GUI programs
from the player processes allows us to run the latter on hosts to which end
users do not have physical access.
Note also that the reliance on the registration process allows the users
to use the High Level Communication (HLC) layer in a ‘safe mode’. In
such a mode the users can trust the security of the messages they exchange
through a ‘public’ communications system, by relying on the encryption of
the messages using the public key cryptography. This can be achieved, for
example, by modifying the first call of the termination loop, in action (v)
of Subsection 4.4, so that it includes the collection of public keys of the
registered players. Subsequent messsages sent by player processes can from
that moment on be encrypted with recipients’ public keys.
We do assume that the communications network, gateways and local reg-
istries run on secure hosts. The security issues involved here are generic and
independent of the properties and characteristics of any specific mechanism
in which the players may engage. However, we do not assume that player
processes run on secure hosts, thus allow for the possibility that they can
be tampered with or tailor made, to let their end users cheat. In the next
subsection we discuss how to deal with this problem.
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5.2 Distributed Policing
One possibility to tamper with the system consists of altering the code of
a player process so that it sends to some players a falsified decision or a
falsified tax scheme. By policing we mean here a sequence of actions that
will lead to the exclusion of such processes (that we call dishonest). The
qualification ‘distributed’ refers to the fact that the policing is done by the
player processes themselves, without intervention of any central authority.
Below we call a player process honest if it multicasts a true tax scheme.
The difficulty in implementing distributed policing lies in the fact that
dishonest processes may behave inconsistently. To resolve this problem we
make use of registries that are assumed to be reliable. We then modify the
sequence of actions of each player process so that it always computes the
decision and the tax scheme but sends them only to its local registry. The
local registry then dispatches the tax scheme on behalf of its sender to all
player processes mentioned in the tax scheme. As a trusted intermediary,
the registry ensures that the same tax scheme is sent to all player processes
involved, and that no player process can send more than one tax scheme in
a single phase.
The resulting sequence of actions performed by each player process pi is
now as follows, where the new steps are (vi)–(viii):
(i) process pi representing player i is created and assigned a globally
unique name,
(ii) pi obtains player i’s type,
(iii) pi signs in at the local registry r in its region,
(iv) if pi receives the confirmation of the registration it broadcasts player
i’s type and otherwise it terminates,
(v) pi performs the termination loop,
(vi) pi computes the decision and the tax scheme of the players and sends
this information to its local registry, requesting the latter to dispatch
this information, on its behalf, to all other player processes,
(vii) pi collects the decisions and the tax schemes dispatched by all other
player processes. By comparing them with the true decision and tax
scheme computed by itself, pi identifies the set of honest player pro-
cesses, honesti,
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(viii) pi performs the termination loop and terminates.
Note that upon termination each player process pj has the same set
honestj. This way all honest processes gain the common knowledge of their
own identities, which makes it possible for them to ‘reconvene’ in the case
a falsified tax scheme was sent, or to finalize the tax handling with the tax
collector otherwise. processes.
5.3 Fault-tolerance
Our system supports fault-tolerance on various levels. First, the llsend(m,
r) operation of the Lower Level Communication (LLC) layer returns a
Boolean value that indicates its success or failure, so it provides a provi-
sion for recovery. Next, the BTTF algorithm from the BTTF layer detects
persistent process failures.
Additionally, thanks to the duplication of the computation by all players,
we can easily modify the design to support fault-tolerance on the mechanism
design level. Namely, suppose that some of the player processes crashed after
they broadcast the players’ types. This will be discovered by one of the
invocations of the termination loop of the player process. One can modify
this loop by including in it a provision that in case of a discovery of such a
crash the computation of the player process restarts the computation with
action (iv).
Accordingly, each player process that did not crash can simply ignore
discovery of such crashes and compute the decision and the tax scheme
anyway. Such an approach is meaningful when to take a decision a quorum
or a sufficient funding level is needed and the broadcast types show that
none is present.
6 Examples
We used our distributed mechanism design system in a number of test cases
that we now briefly describe. Each of them, is implemented as an instanti-
ation of the player process layer described in Subsection 4.4.
6.1 Vickrey auction with redistribution
In Vickrey auction there is a single object for sale which is allocated to
the highest bidder who pays the second highest bid. We consider here the
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proposal of [4] in which the highest bidder redistributes some amounts from
his payment to other players. This minimizes the overall tax.
First we model Vickrey auction as the following decision problem (D,Θ1, . . . ,
Θn, v1, . . . , vn, f):
• D = {1, . . . , n},
• each Θi is the set R+ of non-negative reals; θi ∈ Θi is player i’s
valuation of the object,
• vi(d, θi) :=
{
θi if d = i
0 otherwise
• f(θ) := i,
where θi = maxj∈[1..n] θj and
1 ∀j ∈ [i+ 1..n] θj < θi.
Here decision d ∈ D indicates to which player the object is sold. By
definition f is an efficient decision rule. Below, given a sequence s of reals
we denote by [s]k the kth largest element in this sequence. For example, for
θ = (1, 5, 2, 3, 2) we have [θ−2]2 = 2 since θ−2 = (1, 2, 3, 2).
The payments (taxes) in Vickrey auction are realized by applying the
VCG mechanism, which yields
t′i(θ) :=
{
−[θ]2 if f(θ) = i
0 otherwise
To formalize the redistribution scheme of [4] in our framework we com-
bine each tax t′i with the following function hi (to ensure that it is well-
defined we need to assume that n ≥ 3):
hi(θ−i) :=
[θ−i]2
n
that is, by using
ti(θ) := t
′
i(θ) + hi(θ−i).
Note that this yields a Groves mechanism since by the definition of the
VCG mechanism for specific functions h′1, . . . , h
′
n
t′i(θ) := h
′
i(θ−i) +
∑
j 6=i
vj(f(θ), θj)
1In case of a tie we allocate the object to the player with the highest index.
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and consequently
ti(θ) = (hi + h
′
i)(θ−i) +
∑
j 6=i
vj(f(θ), θj).
The resulting mechanism is feasible since for all i ∈ [1..n] and θ we have
[θ−i]2 ≤ [θ]2 and as a result
n∑
i=1
ti(θ) =
n∑
i=1
t′i(θ) +
n∑
i=1
hi(θ−i) =
n∑
i=1
−[θ]2 + [θ−i]2
n
≤ 0.
Let, given the sequence θ of submitted bids (types), pi be the permutation
of 1, . . . , n such that θpi(i) = [θ]i for i ∈ [1..n] (where we break the ties by
selecting players with the higher index first). So the ith highest bid is by
player pi(i) and the object is sold to player pi(1). Then
• [θ−i]2 = [θ]3 for i ∈ {pi(1), pi(2)},
• [θ−i]2 = [θ]2 for i ∈ {pi(3), . . . , pi(n)},
so the above mechanism boils down to the following payments by player
pi(1):
• [θ]3
n
to player pi(2),
• [θ]2
n
to players pi(3), . . . , pi(n),
• [θ]2 −
2
n
[θ]3 −
n−2
n
[θ]2 =
2
n
([θ]2 − [θ]3) to the tax collector,
that is, it does indeed coincide with the scheme of [4].
6.2 Unit demand auction
We now consider an auction with multiple items offered for sale. We as-
sume that there are n players and m items and that each player submits a
valuation for each item. The items should be allocated in such a way that
each player receives at most one of them and the aggregated valuation is
maximal.
This auction can be modelled as the following decision problem:
• D = {f | f : A→ {1, . . . , n}, A ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}, f is 1-1},
i.e., each decision is a 1-1 allocation of items to players,
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• Θi = R
m
+ ; (θi,1, . . . , θi,m) ∈ Θi is a vector of player i’s valuations of
the items for sale,
• vi(d, θi) :=
{
θi,j if d(j) = i
0 if ¬∃j d(j) = i
• f(θ′) := d for which
∑
j∈dom(d) θ
′
d(j),j is maximal.
Decision rule f is clearly efficient, so Groves Theorem can be used. Our
distributed implementation of the corresponding VCG mechanism is again
realized as an instance of the player process layer of Subsection 4.4 with the
following details concerning computation of the decision and taxes.
When a player has received the types from all the registered players he
needs to compute the decision. To this end we use the Kuhn-Munkres algo-
rithm to compute the maximum weighted matching, where the weight asso-
ciated with the edge (j, i) is the valuation for item j reported by player i. In
our implementation we used the Java source code available at http://adn.cn/blog/article.asp?id=49
To compute tax for player i according to the VCG mechanism this algo-
rithm needs to be used again, to compute the maximum weighted matching
with player i excluded.
6.3 Single minded auction
Next we consider an auction studied in [9] in which there are n players and
m items, with each player only interested in a specific set of items (which
explains the name of the auction). In our approach we limit ourselves to the
situation in which each player i is only interested in a consecutive sequence
ai, . . . , bi of the items 1, . . . ,m, with 1 ≤ ai ≤ bi ≤ m.
We model this as the following decision problem:
• D = {f | f : A→ {1, . . . , n}, A ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}},
• Θi = R+; θi ∈ Θi is player i’s valuation for the sequence ai, . . . , bi of
the items,
• vi(d, θi) :=
{
θi if d(j) = i for all j ∈ [ai, . . . , bi]
0 otherwise
• f(θ′) := d for which
∑
i:d([ai,...,bi])={i}
θ′i is maximal, where d([ai, . . . , bi]) =
{d(j) | j ∈ [ai, . . . , bi]}.
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So, given an allocation f ∈ D the goods in the set {k | f(k) = j} are
allocated to player j. Note that alternatively f can be defined by:
f(θ′) := d for which
n∑
i=1
vi(d, θ
′
i) is maximal.
So f is efficient and consequently Groves Theorem applies. The compu-
tations of the decision and of the taxes within the player process layer of
Subsection 4.4 involve constructions of the maximum weighted matchings
that are computed using a dynamic programming algorithm, details of which
are omitted.
6.4 Sequential Groves mechanisms
In the original set up of the decision problem all players announce their types
independently. In a modification studied in [2] the types are announced
sequentially, in a random order.
Suppose that the random order is 1, . . . , n. The crucial difference be-
tween the customary set up and the one now considered is that player i
knows the types announced by players 1, . . . , i−1. In [2] it was shown that in
Groves mechanisms used for problems concerned with public projects play-
ers have then other dominant strategies than truth-telling (i.e., announcing
their true type) and that these strategies can be used to minimize the taxes.
Sequential Groves mechanisms can be implemented by means of our
distributed mechanism system using the appropriate locking policy loaded
by the local registries. This locking policy takes care that when process pi
receives the confirmation of the registration, it includes its sequence number
j and information whether it represents the last player (the latter is needed
to use other optimal strategies than truth-telling). Then the receive(m, t)
and passiveReceive(m) functions of pi are partly blocked so that only the
messages sent by processes representing players with sequence number < j
can be received, and the bsend() function is blocked until pi has received
the types from these j − 1 processes.
6.5 Other applications
To test the versatility of our approach we also implemented a number of
other examples. These include:
• Vickrey auction,
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• a number of examples of decision making concerned with public projects,
see [10, Chapter 23],
• Walker mechanism of [19].
In the latter mechanism each player i has a utility function of the form
vi(q) := bi(q)−ci(q). Here q is the total amount of public good (for example
grass area in a city) produced by the players, bi(q) is the benefit for player
i from the amount of q of public good, and ci(q) is the cost share player i
has to pay.
Each player i reports a real number xi, which is interpreted as the
amount of public good he agrees to produce. Then he receives the pay-
ment (tax)
ti(x) := (xi+1 − xi−1)
n∑
j=1
xj,
where we interpret n+ 1 as 1 and 1− 1 as n, that is i+ 1 and i− 1 are the
indices of the right-hand and left-hand neighbours of player i in a ring.
So x =
∑n
j=1 xj is the total amount of public good produced and the
final utility for player i is of the form ui(x) := vi(x) + ti(x).
This mechanism is not an instance of Groves mechanism and implements
the decision not in dominant strategies but in a Nash equilibrium. To im-
plement it we again merely modified the player process layer. To test this
mechanism we used specific functions bi and ci.
7 Conclusions and future work
In this paper we discussed a design and implementation of a platform that
supports distributed mechanism design and that can be customized to spe-
cific Internet-based applications.
We believe that the proposed platform clarifies how the design of sys-
tems supporting distributed decision making through the Internet can profit
from sound and proven principles of software engineering, such as separa-
tion of concerns and hierarchical design. The discussed platform is built as
a sequence of layers. The lower layers provide support for distributed com-
puting, while the upper ones are concerned only with the matters specific
to mechanism design. Specific Internet-based applications can be readily
realized by creating a backbone of local registries and selecting appropriate
registration details.
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We found that the division of the software into layers resulted in a flexi-
ble design that could be easily customized to specific mechanisms proposed
in the literature, such as (sequential) Groves mechanisms and Walker mech-
anism, and to specific applications, such as various forms of auctions. For
example, our distributed implementation of Vickrey auction required mod-
ification of a module of only 60 lines of code. Additionally, this layered
architecture offers a multi-level protection scheme against manipulations,
distributed policing and supports fault-tolerance.
We also provided evidence that software engineering in the area of mul-
tiagent systems can profit from the techniques developed in the area of
distributed computing, for example broadcasting in an environment with an
unknown number of processes, distributed termination and barrier synchro-
nization.
In our work we have not dealt with the problem of false-name bids, see
[20], that needs to be addressed anew in the context of distributed imple-
mentations. This is the subject of our current research. Also, we plan to
use our system to implement continuous double auctions.
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Appendix I
We explain here the details of the reduced tax scheme algorithm mentioned
in Section 3. Intuitively, this algorithm determines given the tax vector
(t1, . . . , tn) ‘who pays how much to whom’.
We consider a list of players, each with his tax, and assume that the tax
vector is feasible, that is the total sum of taxes is non-positive. This means
that the claims of the players whose taxes are positive can be financed by
the players whose taxes are negative.
First the players are divided into two lists, A0neg, . . . , A
k
neg, consisting of
players whose taxes are negative (i.e., those who should pay the taxes) and
A0pos, . . . , A
m
pos consisting of players whose taxes are strictly positive (i.e.,
those who should be paid). Players whose tax is 0 are omitted.
We start with player A0neg and compare the absolute value of his tax,
|t0neg|, with the tax t
0
pos of player A
0
pos.
If |t0neg| ≥ t
0
pos, player A
0
neg pays the amount t
0
pos to player A
0
pos. This
changes the tax of player A0neg from t
0
neg to t
0
neg + t
0
pos. The process is now
repeated with player A0neg and the next unpaid player, A
1
pos.
If |t0neg| < t
0
pos, then player A
0
neg pays the amount |t
0
neg| to player A
0
pos.
This changes the tax of player A0pos from t
0
pos to t
0
pos + t
0
neg. The process is
now repeated with the next player who should pay a tax, A1neg, and player
A0pos.
The loop stops when all players with negative taxes paid. Termination is
ensured by the assumption that the tax vector is feasible. If the mechanism
is not balanced, upon termination each player that still needs to pay some
tax pays it to the tax collector.
The pseudo-code of the algorithm is given in Figure 3.
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Lall is the list of n players;
Ai is the (i+ 1)st player in the list Lall;
nall is the length of the list Lall;
ti is the tax of player Ai;
tax is the list representing the computed tax scheme;
for i = 0 to nall do
if ti < 0 then
append Ai to the list Lneg;
end if
if ti > 0 then
append Ai to the list Lpos;
end if
end for;
let Ajneg be the (j + 1)st player in the list Lneg;
tjneg is the tax of player A
j
neg ;
let Akpos be the (k + 1)st player in the list Lpos;
tkpos is the tax of player A
k
pos;
let nneg be the length of the list Lneg;
let npos be the length of the list Lpos;
let tcursum be the current sum of all the negative taxes not yet paid;
if nneg != 0 then
k = 0; j = 1; tcursum = t
0
neg;
while j ≤ nneg and k < npos do
if |tcursum| ≥ tkpos then
player j − 1 pays player k
amount = tkpos − (|tcursum| − |t
j−1
neg |);
tj−1neg = t
j−1
neg + (t
k
pos − (|tcursum| − |t
j−1
neg |));
tcursum = t
j−1
neg ;
k = k + 1;
if tcursum == 0 then
tcursum = t
j
neg; j = j + 1;
end if
else
player j − 1 pays player k amount = |tj−1neg |;
tcursum = tcursum + t
j
neg; j = j + 1;
end if
tax = tax+(j − 1, k, amount);
end while
end if
Figure 3: The algorithm to compute reduced tax scheme
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Appendix II
In this appendix we illustrate a sample interaction with the platform. We
assume that each player chooses from the pull down menu a single minded
auction, discussed in Section 6.3. We consider a specific instance with
• 5 players,
• 3 items for sale,
• the following players bids: A: 20:(1,2), B: 50:(3), C: 32:(2), D: 60:(2,3),
E: 19:(1),
that is, player A bids 20 for the bundle (1,2), etc.
The registration process was taken care of by creating two local registries.
In this example, the generated allocation is: (3:B, 28), (2:C, 10), (1:E, 0),
that is item 3 is sold to player B who pays for it to the tax collector 28, etc.
The interaction with the system is presented in Figures 4 – 9 below. The
first two figures depict phase 1 which consists of the registration process
for players A and B. The 2nd phase, depicted in Figures 6 and 7, is type
submission that takes place after the registration is accepted.
The 3rd phase consists of the computation of the tax scheme, its multi-
casting of it to other players and (in case of unbalanced mechanism) payment
of the remaining taxes to the tax collector. The 4th phase consists of re-
ceiving by the players information from the tax collector about the overal
tax received by it. These two phases are depicted in Figures 8 and 9. They
show the difference in computation between fast players (here player A) and
slow players (here player B). In this example, in phase 3, the tax scheme
was only computed by the fast player, A, who subsequently multicast it.
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Figure 4: Phase 1: player A
Figure 5: Phase 1: player B
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Figure 6: Phase 2: player A
Figure 7: Phase 2: player B
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Figure 8: Phases 3 & 4: player A
Figure 9: Phases 3 & 4: player B
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